Introduction
Economic and legal entities do not always coincide for competition law purposes, as competition law mainly structures economic entities' behaviour.
1 A single economic entity frequently comprises distinct corporate legal persons, jointly contributing to a single economic enterprise. To the extent that multiple corporate legal entities present themselves as a single economic entity, the scope of competition law enforcement alters in relation to interactions within and among those constituent legal entities. This article explores the conditions enabling competition law practitioners successfully to establish the claim that multiple corporate entities present a single entity for the purposes of competition law. These single entity claims will be discussed in light of recent developments in U.S. antitrust and EU competition law.
2
The single entity concept is inherently double-edged. On the one hand, single entity claims exonerate or shield market behaviour from competition law sanctions. On the other, they also potentially extend the reach of competition law fines to related legal entities. Reliance on single entity claims allows competition authorities to include parent companies or otherwise affiliated businesses in the calculation and imputation of competition law penalties directly related to subsidiaries' behaviour. A broad 'single economic entity' conception thus enables competition authorities to sanction larger entities comprising multiple affiliated corporations. 3 As such, single entity provides a defense for businesses (defensive dimension) and an enhanced 'prosecutorial' device for competition authorities (prosecutorial dimension).
The defensive dimension garnered most attention in U.S. antitrust analysis. EU law also considered single entity defenses but recent scholarly and judicial attention there is dominated by single entity prosecutions. More particularly, the liability of parent companies for competition law infringements of a subsidiary is gaining prominence among EU competition law professionals. 5 The limits and possibilities of attributing competition law actions to parent companies have revitalized long held discussions on the notion of undertaking as a tool to enforce EU competition law.
Throughout these different emphases, both legal systems have struggled to develop a nuanced and generally applicable single entity framework determining the boundaries of competition law enforcement. In so doing, judges have increasingly taken notice of particular economic criteria related to control (rights), business interests and market conduct within and among different affiliated businesses. In this article, we aim to structure the case law criteria in newly proposed U.S. and EU single entity testing frameworks. We highlight that both legal systems rely on similar criteria and attach similar (but not entirely equal) weight to different conditions of control and conduct. In so doing, we aim to uncover the single entity narratives that guide EU and U.S. judges and regulators. More specifically, we aim to provide new ways of reflecting upon the EU's single entity test in light of future refining or convergence initiatives. 6 The following two parts of this paper elaborate on the different applications of single entity claims in U.S. antitrust and EU competition law. We demonstrate that both legal systems rely on similar conceptions of control and conduct to define and delineate single entity claims. The concrete applications and interrelationships among these conceptions nevertheless differ in scope and intensity. The second part sketches the rise of the single entity defense in U.S. antitrust law and its apparent curtailment in the recent American Needle case. The third part analyzes the scope of single entity claims as engrained in the EU's undertaking concept. It distinguishes the defensive dimension from the more recent prosecutorial dimension and extracts the scope of EU single entity claims from both dimensions. A concluding fourth part argues that the notions of control and conduct require more elaboration in both legal systems to enhance the certainty and predictability of single entity tests. Mutual refinement through comparing EU and U.S. approaches provides a relevant stepping stone towards developing a full-fledged and detailed single entity test in both legal systems.
Single entity claims in U.S. antitrust law
This part discusses the state of single entity claims in U.S. antitrust law. Entities subject to antitrust investigations often claim that they present a single economic entity to which U.S.
cartel prohibitions do not apply. Following a general introduction into the analytical framework of single entity claims (section 1), we discuss the seminal cases that have structured single entity debates over the last century (section 2). We subsequently argue how particular readings of these cases triggered the outcome in the 2010 American Needle judgment (section 3). That outcome provides a basis for the establishment of a nuanced U.S.
antitrust single entity test (section 4). wholly owned subsidiaries and their parents do not eliminate competition that would otherwise exist; they rather enhance their own ability to compete. 54 The original purpose of the Sherman Act was to address the use of corporate subsidiaries as devices to eliminate competition. 55 Establishing a per se rule against intra-enterprise conspiracy leaves 'a significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to efficiencies associated with integration'. 56 Moreover, mere functional integration of subsidiary and parent 'has never been sufficient to establish the existence of an unreasonable restraint of trade'. 57 Actions of affiliated corporations can nevertheless be unrelated to the aim of functional integration and could thus impose restraints on third parties of sufficient magnitude to restrain market-wide competition. 58 If that were the case, it is appropriate to characterize conduct as a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.
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Only a full-fledged rule of reason analysis would be able to assess the scope of behaviour of affiliated corporations or businesses.
Based on Justice Stevens' dissent, the narrow approach proposes a rule of reason analysis, except in the specific situation of a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary. In the latter instance, a per se non-application of antitrust law would remain in place. Agreements between otherwise affiliated corporations would be subjected to rule of reason analysis. A footnote in the Copperweld majority opinion seems to confirm that approach. The Court there claimed that a single entity tests sets forth various criteria for evaluating whether a given parent and subsidiary are capable of conspiring with each other. Those criteria measure the "separateness" of the subsidiary, rather than to proclaim its unity. They include separate control of day-to-day operations, separate officers, separate headquarters etc. In case of wholly owned subsidiaries however, these separateness criteria do not serve to evaluate the scope of economic unity that is inherent to wholly owned subsidiary constellations. 60 The narrow reading also invited judges and scholars to devise more nuanced legal tests to however be limited to a unity of interests, because, even in a fully integrated corporation, conflicting interests continue to engage corporate decision making. 62 Unity of interests has often been translated into claims of control rights and control mechanisms related to but also potentially different from corporate ownership. 63 Williamson therefore proposed or at least imagined ownership rights to constitute indications of corporate control. 64 To the extent that no ownership-based control could be inferred, courts would be invited to assess whether or not the corporations involved constitute actual or potential competitors in the market related to the scrutinized activity. Only in cases where actual or potential competition threats are absent should the courts approve single entity claims. Moreover, even though the Court generally treats 'agreements within a single firm as independent action on the presumption that the components of the firm will act to maximize the firm's profits', the presumption does not hold in rare cases 'when the parties to the agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself and the intra-firm agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action'. 89 The collective licensing of intellectual property through NFLP could potentially represent such a rare case. Affirmative rights establish rights to redeploy assets or impose initiatives, including the right to delegate functions or to exit a governance structure without obtaining approval. These rights are often -but do not have to be -connected to company ownership. 105 Negative control rights on the other hand are rights to block other parties initiatives, through approval or veto procedures. Again, these rights could be related to ownership, and often are, but do not necessarily have to be held solely by a majority shareholder. 106 The presence of strong affirmative and negative control rights could reflect a prima facie unity of purpose or interests.
The test focuses primarily on whether the ownership, management, and operations of the separate entities are, in fact, sufficiently interrelated to warrant treating them as an integrated enterprise or a single entity. A business or organization need not meet all five factors to be considered a single entity with a covered Federal contractor. However, there is growing recognition that centralized control over labor relations and personnel functions is the most important factor. By way of example, say that two entities are under common ownership, with a common board of directors, and have a central corporate office that determines and issues personnel policy for both entities, and generally manages most personnel-related issues for both entities. At the same time, the operations of the two entities are not particularly dependent on each other. Despite the fact that one of the factors did not apply, the four factors that did outweigh the one that did not, so that the two entities being
The extent to which control rights establish presumptions of single entity is unclear at best.
The types or kinds of affirmative or negative rights that are determinate in establishing single entity status are difficult to detect in the abstract and without full-fledged rule of reason analysis. It therefore remains to be seen how much weight will be attached to particular control rights.
Control rights could -but should not -be related to ownership rights. A first step in analyzing control could thus be the reflection of ownership structures. In a Copperweld situation (wholly owned subsidiary, or unincorporated divisions or entity-employee relationships), which antitrust infringements could be related. In the former case, controlling rights and interests could more easily support the conclusion that entities are competitors in "the" market. In the latter case, which is the preferable choice, a full rule of reason analysis, including determining the relevant market and market shares of entities would be required to determine the activities of controlling (and controlled) entities in a particular market segment, at least to the extent that they constitute actual competitors. 115 If no actual competition seems present, the potentiality of these entities competing in a particular market segment should be predicted. American Needle seems to rely on that approach, assessing the potential competitive relationships among NFL teams in the intellectual property markets. 
Single entity claims in EU competition law
This part discusses single entity claims in EU competition law. The concept of single entity is structured within the undertaking concept in EU law (section 1). The notion of undertaking has been applied to limit the scope of competition law enforcement (section 2), but more recently, focus has shifted towards extending the scope of imputation of fines (section 3).
Both approaches rely on similar concepts and reflect a the nascence of an EU single entity test based on control and conduct conceptions similar to those in U.S. antitrust law (section 4).
3.1.The entity component of undertakings and the application and enforcement of EU competition law
Single entity analysis in EU law is enshrined a broader 'undertaking' concept. 119 The notion of undertaking is pivotal for the scope of application of EU competition law. As is wellknown, Article 101 TFEU prohibits restrictive agreements between undertakings, whereas
Article 102 prohibits undertakings to abuse a dominant market position. Agreements or coordinated action among components of a single undertaking fall outside the scope of the Article 101 prohibition. 120 They can only be captured by the Article 102 prohibition if these single undertaking components engage in abusive market behaviour. 121 The presence and scope of an undertaking depends on judicially established conditions and limits. From the 1991 Höfner judgment onwards 122 , the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
consistently set forth a single definition of undertaking: 'the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed'. 123 This definition comprises two components:
entity and economic activity. 124 The second component mainly determines the extent to which particular activities can be considered 'economic'. The case law on this component assesses whether social security providers or public enterprises engage in economic activities. 125 That question is not directly relevant for our analysis of the entity component and will not be discussed here.
The basic elements of the (single) entity component have been interpreted quite consistently over time. 126 In the Shell-case 127 the General Court stated that a single entity is an 'economic unit which consist of an unitary organization of personal, tangible and intangible elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can contribute to the commission of an infringement of the kind referred to in that provision'. 128 Earlier ECJ case law stated that an entity could consist of 'several persons, natural or legal'. 129 In particular, multiple legal persons could be considered a single entity if business or personal links exist between those legal persons. The notion of business links refers to a parent company effectively influencing commercial policy, personal links relate to the sharing of directors or executives among different legal persons. 130 Not unlike U.S. antitrust law, the single entity concept is thus approached from a functional perspective. Legal personhood does not play a determining role in establishing the limits of the undertaking concept.
The entity concept thus determines the scope of application of EU competition law. To the extent that a particular business structure does not fit the entity definition, EU competition prohibitions will not apply to that structure's behaviour. Simultaneously, the single entity notion also determines the scope of the structure 'to which a certain behaviour is attributable'. 131 The latter function allows competition authorities to develop single entity claims in order to impose fines on groups of corporate entities. Single entity claims in that respect enhance competition law prosecution. According to Regulation 1/2003, the fines imposed on undertakings or associations of undertakings when infringements of the articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty are committed intentionally or negligently, shall not exceed 10% of the total turnover in the preceding business year of each undertaking and association of undertakings participating in the infringement. 132 Group members can thus be held jointly and severally liable for competition law infringements. 133 A more extensive entity conception that integrates different legal entities into a single economic entity allows for higher fines to be calculated on the turnover of every component of that single entity.
3.2.Single entity defenses in EU competition law
The single entity concept has long provided groups of corporate legal persons with an escape from EU competition law. In 1971, the ECJ held that one undertaking could comprise several corporations which can be organized in a simple parent company and subsidiary scheme or in even more complex schemes with several levels of subsidiaries. 134 When dealing with a group of undertakings, the constituent factor one should bear in mind is not whether those undertakings have a separate legal personality, but whether or not they act together on the market as a single unit. 135 Single unit market conduct implies that a subsidiary or affiliate has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market. 136 The assessment of single economic unit status crucially depends on control and conduct factors, including among others parental control over the board of directors, instructions imposed on the subsidiary to be carried out, the amount of profit taken by the parent and other elements referring to real decisive influence by a parent over its subsidiary. 137 The exact weight attributed to either ownership, non-ownership control or additional conduct factors has been the subject of intense discussions and divergent interpretations.
The interrelations between control and conduct are most apparent in the case law on the single entity status of hybrid affiliations involved in distribution, commercial agency and other intermediary agreements. 138 Commercial agency agreements potentially benefit from single entity immunity, as the conduct of 'independent' commercial agents 139 is often quite dependent on instructions received from a principal. 140 In the pilot case of Suiker-Unie 141 , the ECJ affirmed what already had been established in earlier decisions of the European Commission. 142 It stated that 'if an agent works for the benefit of his principal he may in principle be treated as an auxiliary organ forming an integral part of the latter's undertaking, who must carry out his principal's instructions and thus, like a commercial employee, forms an economic unit with this undertaking'. 143 The Court of Justice presented a two-step test relying on market conduct in order to verify the degree of autonomy of the agent. First the agent may not bear any financial risk. Second, the agent may not engage in activities of both agent and independent trader in respect of the same market. 144 In the Suiker-Unie case the ECJ decided that article 101 TFEU was applicable since '(…) it is not disputed that the agents in question are large business houses, which at the same time as they distribute sugar for the account of the applicant, (…) undertake a very considerable amount of business for their own on the sugar mark 145 (…) Thus these representatives are authorized to act as independent dealer 146 (…)The integration of representatives in its sales organization 'did not rule out the possibility that agents may also compete with independent dealers, in particular when they sell for their own account (…)'.
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The Court subsequently extended this reasoning to wholly owned subsidiaries. In the important Viho case 148 , Parker Pen Ltd. sold its products through wholly owned subsidiaries in various member states. In so doing, the parent company divided the common market into national markets between its subsidiaries. The ECJ, following the General Court's approach, did not consider Article 101 applicable in this context. According to the court, 'where, as in this case, the subsidiary, although having a separate legal personality, does not freely determine its conduct on the market but carries out the instructions given to it directly or indirectly by the parent company by which it is wholly controlled, Article [101] does not apply to the relationship between the subsidiary and the parent company with which it forms an economic unit'. 149 The distribution subsidiaries did not enjoy real autonomy in determining their course of action in the market, as they merely had to carry out the instructions of the controlling parent company.
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Suiker Unie and Viho present an EU single entity test relying on control and conduct.
Whereas Suiker Unie presumes non-ownership based control, Viho distinguishes elements of ownership-based control (intra-enterprise behaviour or potentially decisive influence) and market conduct (extra-enterprise behaviour or actual decisive influence 151 ) as two fundamental variables to establish single entity claims in EU law. 152 Neither Suiker Unie nor
Viho did establish a clear hierarchy among these elements. The degree to which ownership based control, alternative control elements or specific market conduct determine single entity claims remains unclear.
The ECJ also considered whether or not employee agreements could be captured by Article 101. Again, it relied on similar elements of control and conduct to assess single entity claims.
Competition law may apply to a natural person who constitutes an undertaking in accordance with article 101 TFEU when acting independently. 153 However in the Albany case the Advocate General argued that this was not the case when an individual acts as an employee on the economic market. 'First, it is difficult to see how the term 'undertaking' could be understood in the sense of 'employee'. (…)Secondly, the functional interpretation of the term 'undertaking' which the Court has adopted in its case-law leads to the same result (…) thirdly, the system of Community competition law is not tailored to be applicable to employees'.
Since an employee cannot act independently from the undertaking, he or she is incorporated in the undertaking. The undertaking therefore comprises an economic unit with each employee.
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In determining if an individual acts independently or as an employee, the ECJ again takes into account whether or not the individual bears the direct commercial risk of the transaction 156 ,
whether they are subject to orders from their employer and whether they offer services and goods to different clients or work for one single employer. 157 The ECJ decided that custom agents constitute undertakings since 'they offer, for payment services consisting in the carrying out of customs formalities, (…)as well as complementary services (…) Furthermore, they assume the financial risks involved in the exercise of that activity'. 158 The Court also applied these constituent factors in later cases. Registered members of the Bar Association (self-employed lawyers) are undertakings, 159 as are self-employed medical specialists. 160 Dock workers have an employment relationship with the undertakings for which they perform dock work as they work for and under the direction of each of those undertakings. 3.3.Single entity prosecution and parent company liability
In addition to providing a shield against applying EU competition rules, single entity claims have more recently been rediscovered as swords to extend the scope of enforcement of these rules. 162 In so doing, similar criteria also relied on to exclude single entities from the scope of competition law have resurfaced to ensure a more inclusive entity subject to competition law fines. The prosecutorial perspective provides fundamental insights into how the ECJ operationalizes or could further operationalize the weight attached to ownership, control and conduct requirements in a general EU single entity test.
The ECJ established that infringements committed by subsidiaries could be attributed to the parent company or to other "related" companies 163 , to the extent that the latter exercise direct or actual influence over the subsidiary's decisionmaking practices. 164 In those instances, an undertaking will often be held to have engaged in restrictive practices with another undertaking, represented by a subsidiary corporate entity. Parent companies can thus be held liable for restrictive practices engaged in by subsidiaries.
The conditions for attributing competition law infringements to parent companies -and thus to establish single entity status -rely on control and market conduct variables. According to the ECJ, 'the fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of its conduct being imputed to the parent company, especially where the subsidiary does not independently decide its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company'. 165 The ability to influence market conduct is in the first place assessed in light of present control rights, rather than the actual exercise of control as such. 166 In that respect, particular attention is paid to 'the economic, organisational and legal links between [different] legal entities'. 167 The concept of control nevertheless presents operational difficulties in determining a correct standard to assess whether or not economic, legal or organizational links are sufficient. With a view to operationalize control, the Courts have regularly relied on ownership presumptions to substantiate corporate control claims.
In Akzo, the ECJ held that 'in the specific case where a parent company has a 100% shareholding in a subsidiary which has infringed the Community competition rules, first, the parent company can exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of the subsidiary and, second, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary'. 168 Full ownership does not only presume corporate control, it also presumes decisive market conduct influence. 169 The fact that other circumstances had been taken into account in earlier case law 170 , does not however make the application of the presumption 'subject to the production of additional indicia relating to the actual exercise of influence by the parent company'.
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Akzo is particularly controversial because the ECJ took sides in a debate that included two approaches to single entity prosecution. 172 The first approach entailed a full blown (belts and braces) inquiry of single entity, requiring the European Commission to establish both control and conduct parameters being fulfilled in order to attribute anticompetitive conduct to a parent company. The second approach requires the Commission merely to establish control and imposes the entire burden of proof on the defendant parent company to establish its nonsingle entity status. 173 It requires the parent company to establish that it did not influence the subsidiary's conduct or did not fully control the subsidiary's decision making process.
The burden of proving the absence of influence on conduct or lack of control has generated controversy, as two readings can be adduced to rebut a presumption of single entity based on parenthood. According to the General Court and confirmed on appeal by the Court of Justice, the parent company should establish that it was not 'able to influence pricing policy production and distribution activities, sales objectives, gross margins, sales costs, cash flow, 168 Akzo, note 164 above, para 60 169 175 Scholars have read that requirement to impose on parent companies the burden to establish lack of management influence on the conduct of the subsidiary in general and not merely on the market related to competition law infringements. 176 More specifically, it would require a parent company to establish that it did not have control over the subsidiary's operations, which would in practice be impossible to achieve, because a parent -subsidiary relationship precisely by nature implies some level of control. 177 We do however read the ECJ's 'all elements' requirements in a more nuanced way.
According to that reading, the ECJ meant to hold that its presumption of single entity could be rebutted by both evidence related to control and to conduct. It does not however hold that claims solely based on either control or conduct are insufficient to rebut the Akzo presumption. In line with the Advocate General, 'the decisive factor is whether the parent company, by reason of the intensity of its influence, can direct the conduct of its subsidiary to such an extent that the two must be regarded as one economic unit'. 178 The ECJ merely provided a basis for a single entity test based on interacting control and conduct variables. To the extent that a presumption of control has been established, lack of influence on particular conduct could still remain sufficient evidence to rebut single entity claims. The extent to which that is the case does however remain unclear from the Court's judgment in Akzo. In all instances however, control rights appear sufficient to pass the first single entity hurdle.
Control rights have to be direct: the mere presence of a single parent company of two sister companies cannot suffice to infer elements of control among sister companies' interactions.
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Direct control rights therefore often presuppose a vertical relationship, whether ownership based or not.
In addition to control, integrated market conduct comprises a second step in establishing a single entity test. As mentioned above, the scope of market conduct could be assessed either in general or in the specific market related to the competition law infringement at stake.
"Market conduct" assesses whether a subsidiary or controlled entity is able to determine its own policies and actions on the market or the actual freedom it has been granted to operate in a particular market segment. 184 To the extent it cannot do either, the controlled entity is presumed to constitute a single undertaking with the controlling entity. 185 From a 180 One could even argue that the ECJ is more direct here than the US Supreme Court in American Needle. The US Supreme Court only discussed control in the margin of its independent centers of decisionmaking condition in American Needle. Read in conjunction with Copperweld however, one could (and in our opinion, should) argue that control is crucial in the U.S. single entity's test as well. As part two highlighted, control remains the most fundamental proxy for assessing the independence of decisionmaking centers. 181 At least in cases concerning parent company liability, but see T. Feaster and P. Treacy, 'When two into one will go: intra-group agreements and Article 85(1)', E.L.Rev. 27 (1997) , 576 for a perspective on 'single entity defenses'. 182 According to A. Montesa and A. Givaja, , note 3 above, 571, a parent company may 'exercise' its power to influence the subsidiary by putting in place appropriate management/controlling mechanisms allowing it to control the subsidiary's market conduct in general, that is to say, at least with regard to its main strategic plans. This mechanism could take the form of (a) management teams appointed by the parent company to control the subsidiary as in Viho; or (b) the adoption of a coordination role by the parent company reinforced by the presence of documents containing express orders for organizing meetings to formulate marketing and pricing policies as in Shell. proposes a more nuanced distinction among different arguments, the weight of which is uncertain in a general integrated market conduct structure. A full-fledged entrepreneurial interest and competitive link test would therefore be more helpful to assess whether two controlled entities do not engage in restrictive practices through integrated market conduct. So far however, the conduct stage of the EU's test remains vague and hardly predictable on a more general level.
Concluding remarks: prospects for single entity convergence?
The previous sections juxtaposed single entity claims as a matter of competition law in the U.S. and the EU. We analyzed how courts in particular developed, explicated or presumed the existence of single entities to define the scope of competition law. EU law debates have mainly focused on the scope of application or on the prosecutorial dimension of single entity, whereas U.S. case law has aimed to integrate single entity analysis more directly into debates on the nature of restraints to competition. Following American Needle, the idea of a per se rule of single entity has been replaced by a set of (quick look) rebuttable presumptions, similar to the approach taken in the EU for much longer. In addition, the EU's recent prosecutorial focus of single entity debates allows to explicate the foundations and conditions of single entity in relation to parent -subsidiary relationships and thereby allows more analytical clarity in devising an EU single entity test. Emphasis on control and conduct in both legal orders allows for a more dynamic and economically oriented inquiry into the scope of competition law provisions. allows us to develop three reasons as to why further convergence among EU and U.S. single entity claims would significantly benefit both legal orders. and could thus provide a more nuanced testing framework for EU law. In addition, the law in both systems now attributes (rebuttable) presumptions of integrated market conduct to wholly owned subsidiaries and potentially extends that approach to less than wholly owned entities.
Both tests thus present comparable variables and a comparable framework for judicial developments in this field.
Second, the establishment of a single entity test in both legal orders remains a matter of judicial lawmaking. In both regimes, a supreme court has the final say on the scope and existence of single entity claims. Even though the European Commission can adopt binding decisions and impose fines as a matter of EU law, its activities are subject to judicial review.
In the end however, the Commission has to take stock of the ECJ's case law on the matter.
The U.S. remedial mechanisms almost exclusively relies on court decisions. In the same way, the U.S. Supreme Court has the final say on legal matters, thus allowing both institutions to develop a single entity test. Convergence could thus significantly be facilitated as the scope of potential convergence actors can be relegated to two courts already regularly interacting with one another. 
